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NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 19097 
Appl'llants take this appeal from a Summary Judgment entered 
-2-
in an action wherein they seek to quiet title to 6.00 acres of 
unimproved real property allegedly located in Davis County, State 
of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was entered in this matter on March 3, 1983, 
and Notice of Appeal was filed and entered on March 31, 1983; there-
after, on or about April 8, 1983, respondent prepared and mailed to 
counsel for appellants a further document, entitled Final Order, 
wherein title was purportedly quieted in the name of Utah Department 
of Transportation as to the real property which is the subject matter 
of this litigation and an additional 12-acre 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Summary Judgment and the Final 
Order reversed and set aside and an Order remanding this matter for 
trial for the purpose of determining title, as between appellants, 
respondent and such other parties as are necessary to a final title 
determination, to the subject lands and such other lands as may be 
1. The Final Order does not appear in the Record on Appeal 
nor ( as of May 3, 1983) is a Docket entry or other 
evidence of the document in the Weber County Clerk's office. 
Respondent's counsel has not advised the writer of this brief 
that the Final Order might have been intercepted or never signed 
by the Court; accordingly it is set forth in the Appendix for 
reference purposes. 
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affected by the true location of the county line between Weber 
and Davis counties. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
II 
Rule 56 (c) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Accordingly, since appellants hereinafter raise an issue on appeal 
challenging the procedure followed by respondent in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the material facts hereinafter set forth will be 
restricted to matters set forth in the pleadings Complaint--
R. 1 and \nswer-- R. 62), the Affidavits of Ronald L. Baxter R.127) 
and Stephen M. Smith ( R. 236), and the admissions of fact-- which 
appellants herewith stipulate to-- contained in this Statement. 
Appellants brought this action against the Department of 
Transportation of the State of Utah to quiet title to 6.00 acres of 
unimproved land claimed to be located in Davis County ( R. 1), the 
land being valuable primarily as a source of gravel-type materials. 
-4-
The Department of Transportation resisted, claiming that it is the 
owner of the subject tract because the land is located in Weber 
County ( R. 62). 
On May 26, 1969 Davis County issued a Tax Deed ( R. 100) to 
Thomas Hollberg, Ronald Baxter and Ronald A. Toone, one-third each, 
as tenants in common, to 18.00 acres of land in Davis County in the 
S. of the N. of SW t of Sec. 25, 5 N., 1 W., Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Thereafter, the purchasers divided the lands, and on 
29, 1970, Baxters acquired the 6.00 acre tract which is 
the subject of this litigation ( R. 116, 117). 
On or about August 20, 1975, Johnson Construction Company 
entered upon the westerly 6.00 acre tract, which had been previously 
conveyed to Ronald A. Toone, and began to excavate and crush gravel 
for a road construction job. Toone then brought action in the Second 
District Court of Davis County in September, 1975 against Johnsoa 
Construction Company to recover the value of the gravel materials 
removed, but he was unsuccessful in the litigation because a jury 
held that the Toone tract of land was located in Weber County and, 
accordingly, Davis County had no authority to tax the land and to 
issue a Tax Deed. In the Toone case the matter went to the jury 
similar Instructions submitted by both parties which, in L·ffect, 
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directed the jury to find whether, as of January 4, 1896, the 
Weber River was located where it then existed at the time of trial 
( and presently exists) or whether in 1896 the river was located 
approximately 1,000 feet farther north, which would have placed it 
north of the Toone tract ( R. 143, 145). It was admitted by both 
litigants in the Toone case that the location of the Weber River, as 
established by law, constituted the boundary line between the two 
counties. 
The jury in the Toone case found the location of the Weber 
River in 1896 to be its present location, thus placing the Toone 
parcel north of the Weber River, and Toone's action against Johnson 
Construction Company failed. Judgment on the Verdict in that action 
was entered on January 7, 1977 (R. 45). 
At no time during the Toone litigation, or prior thereto or 
at any time since, did Johnson Construction Company attempt to remove 
gravel materials from either the Hollberg or Baxter tracts; neverthe-
less, Johnson Construction Company filed a motion in the Toone case to 
join the Hollbergs and Baxters in order 11 ••• to have a complete 
adjudication of the ownership of the properties in question. 11 
( R. 4q) kespondent's counsel in this action, Stephen C. Ward, 
represented .l>lrnsL>n CLmstcuction Company in the Toone case, 
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listing his appearance on all papers in that litigation as 
11 Assistant Attorney General"; however, at no time was the Utah 
Department of Transportation made a party to the Toone litigation 
nor did it seek to become a party. Obviously, since Johnson 
Construction Company had taken no materials for which damages would 
have been paid from the Hollberg or Baxter properties, they were 
not ordered to be made parties in the Toone litigation. 
The Baxter tract of land, which lies contiguous to and 
immediately east of the Toone tract, was not disturbed until 
personnel of the Department of Transportation entered upon the land 
in the spring of 1978 and commenced to removal gravel therefrom (R.4). 
Accordingly, Baxters filed a Notice of Claim with the Department of 
Transportation of the State of Utah on May 10, 1978, as provided 
by Section 63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953( as amended, 1965). 
In their Notice of Claim they asserted title to the subject tract 
and objected to the removal of gravel therefrom. No response was 
made by the Department of Transportation of the State of Utah or 
by the Attorney General within the statutory period of one year, 
and this action was then brought. 
Baxters' Complaint ( R. 1) alleges their ownership to the 
-7 -
subject 6.00 acres of land derived from and through the Tax Deed 
from Davis County (which originally included 18.00 acres), that 
the defendant Department of Transportation claims title to the 
property, that they timely filed their Notice of Claim as provided 
by statute, that no response was made by defendant Department of 
Transportation, and that their title should be quieted against the 
Department of Transportation of the State of Utah. The State's 
Answer ( although not so designated-- R. 62) contains a general 
denial; and it affirmatively asserts, among other things, that the 
Davis County tax sale was invalid, that the property is located in 
Weber County and at all times has been taxed by Weber County, that 
Davis County had no authority to sell the subject tract at tax 
sale and did not follow the proper statutory procedures pertaining 
such sales, that plaintiffs failed to file their claim within the 
one-year period provided by Section 63-30- 12 (as amended 1978), 
that the Toone case was res judicata and that Baxter should be 
collaterally estopped from bringing this action because he was a 
witness in that case. 
to 
the Toone case was tried on the basis of the location 
of the Weber River as it existed on January 4, 1896, Baxters in this 
-8-
action take the position that the Weber River's course has been 
substantially altered since the county lines were first established, 
and that the river's location on January 10, 1866, as established 
by the Territorial laws of the State of Utah and as adopted by the 
Constitution of the State of Utah should govern. Based upon this 
contention, Baxters maintain that the Weber River in 1866 was located 
more than 1,000 feet farther to the north, thus placing their tract 
of land in Davis County. 
Utah Department of Transportation moved for Summary Judgment 
in this case on the grounds that Baxters were judicially barred from 
suing to quiet title against the State of Utah because of the 
decision in the Toone litigation ( R. 84), claiming that the boundary 
line between Weber and Davis counties was finalized in that case and 
that judicial notice should be taken of that fact R. 106), and 
that Ronald L. Baxter was further bound by the Toone decision for the 
reason that he appeared as a witness in the Toone case. Baxter 
countered by Affidavit ( R. 127), asserting pointedly that his only 
contact with the Toone case was that of an expert witness furnishing 
surveying testimony. Department of Transportation did not counter 
Mr. Baxter's Affidavit and did not furnish any other 3dmissible 
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evidence concerning that matter. 
The Second District Court, Hon. Calvin Gould, Judge, granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant Department of Transportation, 
and the same was entered on March 3, 1983. No formal Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of law were entered, but the Court's Memorandum 
Decision ( R. 249) held that (a) Baxters were bound by the decision 
in the Toone v_ Johnson Construction Companv case under the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel since Ronald L. Baxter testified as a witness 
therein and" ... was interested in its result.", and was therefore 
in privity with Toone; that ( b) the Court previously found the 
Tax Deed from Davis County, of which it took judicial notice, to be 
void; and that (c) the Court had finally decided the location of the 
boundary line between Weber and Davis counties in the Toone case, of 
which it also took judicial notice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT AND RESPONDENT BOTH FOLLOWED IMPROPER PROCEDURES 
IN A SUMMARY JUOCMENT SITUATION. 
A motion for summary judgment has been recognized by the courts 
as an exlt'nsi"n of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. By permitting 
-10-
either or both parties to file affidavits and other admissible 
evidence or admissions, cases can sometimes be disposed of without 
the burden of an unnecessary trial. However, Rule 56 (c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limits consideration to 11 ••• the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, ... 11 The foregoing requisites 
were surrnnarized in the matter of In re Williams' Estates, 10 U.2d 83, 
348 P. 2d 683, where this court held that --
11 A surrnnary judgment is proper only if the pleadings. 
depositions. affidavits and admissions show that there 
is no issue of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
" without giving plaintiff the opportunity to present 
... evidence ( which plaintiff claims she can produce) 
in a trial we cannot hold as a matter of law that 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover." 
Underlining added) 
The Record on Appeal in this matter is replete with Memorandum 
Briefs filed by respondent wherein carefully excerpted exhibits and 
documents from the case of Toone v. Johnson Construction Comoanv 
were added to support respondent's position. Inasmuch as :1 motiun 
for surrnnary judgment is primarily handled bv or::il argument ind 
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briefs and documentation, it is not always possible for the 
opposing party to raise objections and keep such items completely 
out of the Record on Appeal as would be done if the offering of such 
items in evidence were attempted at trial. Nevertheless, appellants 
repeatedly objected to the procedure, pointing out that respondent 
" ... has carefully sorted out and selected facts peculiar to its own 
version of the matter, most of which lack materiality ... " R. 119), 
engendering such retorts from respondent as the following: 
" The Plaintiffs neither controverted the stated facts 
nor attempted to state any additional facts. It must then 
be assumed that the Defendant's statement of facts must 
be true." 
Also, in oral argument: 
"Mr. Ward: ' It is always amazing to me, your Honor, that 
when I listen to his side and compare it with 
our side, there is no similarity whatsoever ... ' 
THE COURT: ' That's generally what makes a lawsuit.' II 
( R. 268) 
It is not proper for the moving party seeking summary judgment 
to reach out and, by way of brief or simple argument, raise matters 
which are not properly admitted, nor should the movant attempt to 
shift its hurden of proof to the defending party by such tactics. 
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The identical Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
containsseveral annotated cases which advance tLe foregoing 
proposition: 
"Summary judgment is neither method of avoiding necessity 
for proving one's case nor clever procedural gambit 
whereby claimant can shift to his adversary his burden of 
proof on one or more issues." 
U. S. v. Dibble, C. A. C3l. 1970, 429 F. 2d 598 
Further: 
" Admissibility of evidence on motion for summary judgment 
is governed by rules of evidence applicable at trial." 
Roucher v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 235 F. 2d 423 
Similarly, in the recent case of Schaer v. Utah Department of 
Transportation ( No. 18009, filed January 10, 1983), this Court 
quoted from an earlier case, saying: 
11 Upon a motion for summary judgment, the courts ought 
to recognize, as a minimum, that the opposing party 
produce some evidentiary matter in contradiction of the 
movant's case or specify in an affidavit the reason why 
he cannot do so." 
Nor is it sufficient for a lower court to take 11 judicial notice" 
of another case in the manner outlined in the Memorandum Decision 
on file _herein ( R. 249). Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Evidecice sets 
forth facts which may be judicially noticed bv a trial court, but 
-13-
the rule does not specifically include the taking of judicial 
notice of the record in another action in another case. At any 
rate, Rule 10 provides that the judge " ... afford each party 
reasonable opportunity to present to him information relative to 
the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or to the tenor 
of the matter to be noticed." 
held 
Under the federal cases interpreting Rule 56 (c) it has been 
"Grant of a summary judgment would not be sustained on basis 
of judicial notice of a court's prior case, where trial court 
did not inform parties as to what he noticed, and in his 
order granting summary judgment merely stated he referred to 
the record in a prior action, but failed to include any 
portions of the record of such prior action in his order." 
Soley v. Star 
390 F. 2d 
& Herald Company, C. A. Canal Zone 1968, 
364 
"Before an action may be summarily dismissed on ground of 
res judicata, defense of res judicata must appear from the 
face of complaint or the record of the prior case must be 
received in evidence." 
Guam In•1. Co. v. Central Building, Inc., C.A. Guam 1961, 
288 F. 2d 19 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sections 599 and 600 cover the 
matter at hand: 
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"Sec. 599. - Necessity of proof of record. 
The question sometimes arises whether it is necessary to 
offer or introduce evidence of the record of a prior 
judgment set up as a bar or estoppel, or whether it may be 
established by judicial notice. Although there is some 
authority in support of the rule that a court will take 
judicial notice of a judgment previously rendered by it 
and sought to be made available as a basis for the appli-
cation of the doctrine of res judicata, at least where such 
judgment is referred to in the pleadings, a court ordinarily 
will not take judicial notice of a judgment rendered in a 
different action; it is generally held that the existence and 
contents of a judgment sought_ to be made available as a basis 
for the application of the doctrine of res judicata must be 
proved by offering the record or a"copy thereof in evidence, 
whether the judgment was rendered by the court trying the 
principal case, or by another court. It has also been 
adjudged that oral testimony of a witness relating to facts 
established by a judgment is, under the best evidence rule, 
inadmissible where proper objection is made." 
"Sec. 60U Necessity of proof of whole record. 
Ordinarily, questions as to the effect of judgments as 
res judicata cannot be decided from the judgment alone, 
but must be determined by the aid of the entire record, 
and the general rule is that proof of the whole record 
must be introduced where a party intends to avail him-
self of a judgment as an adjudication on the subject 
matter, particularly where it is material to show the 
premises and grounds on which the judgment is based, or 
the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. 
Under this rule, a judgment entry alone unaccompanied by 
any part of the record or an explanation of its absence, 
is not admissible in evidence, notwithstanding that it 
emanates from a court of general jurisdiction and contains 
general recitals of jurisdiction." 
( Underlining added\ 
This Court has adopted the above -quoted r"a s ,,n in g in Li» c 1 s, 
of Carter v.Carter (Utah 1977), 563 P.2d 177. 
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The lower court wos insistent that the other Tax Deed 
purchasers and Weber County be brought into the litigation (R.160), 
but it refused Baxters' motion to join Monroe( R.229), though 
the Affidavit of Stephen M. Smith, manager of the real property 
department of that company, asserted that Utah Department of 
Transportati.> n " ... claims title to ... approximately eight (8) 
acres of land belonging to Monroe, Inc. in the area north of the 
Weber River as now located." and that the State of Utah has 
" ... trespassed upon and removed gravel materials from Monroe's lands 
in the S. W. l of the SW l of said Section 25 which lie north of 
the '.Jeber River as now located, without any right whatsoever ... " 
( R. 236). 
Weber County was served with the Third Party-Complaint, but 
the lower court, in the final analysis, disregarded its own order 
requiring that Weber County be brought into the action and proceeded 
to summary judgment, stat:ng in its Memorandum Decision ( R. 251) 
that it " ... is unfortunate in this case that neither of the subject 
counties saw fit to enter this litigation and thus protect their 
citizens bv causing the proper determination of a correct boundary." 
,\ctu;illv, h'''"'vcr, \,\·hc>r C•untv dulv filed its Answer 
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to the Amended Third-Party Complaint ( R. 226), asserting therein 
that respondent's Complaint 11 fails to state a cause of action 
against defendant Peber County ... 11 , that it denied 11 allegations 
1 through 6 or parts thereof ... 11 of the Complaint, and that the 
Third-Party Complaint be dismissed and that Weber County have 
judgment against the Utah Department of Transportation for costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in defending the action. 
It is highly unusual for a lower court to order the inclusion 
of an affected governmental agency into a litigation and then, 
as here, proceed to summary judgment and a ruling adverse to the 
same governmental agency brought into the action by its own ruling. 
The subject property lies south ( on the Davis County side) of 
the Interstate Freeway which proceeds east up through Weber Canyon, 
thus making the subject tract physically isolated, in part, from 
access by Weber County, and any transfer of ownership to the utah 
Department of Transportation certainly eliminates any possibility 
that Weber County would receive property taxes from the subject 
lands in future years. There is the further matter that open 
gravel pit operations create special problems of surveillance, contro: 
policing and possible nuisacces, thus making it further prohahlc tha' 
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County would possibly prefer that Davis County should keep the 
property within the latter's jurisdiction. At any rate, and irre-
spective of whatever position Weber County might have ultimately taken 
in the proceedings, the lower court should not have proceeded to 
summary judgment without considering its position. Likewise, in order 
to properly arrive at a determination of title in the area which 
could have been affected by any sudden change of the Weber River 
since 1866, Monroe, Inc., and any other owners of similarly situated 
tracts of land, should have been brought into the litigation in order 
to effect a final determination of titles. 
Responrlent's high-grading of the documents and exhibits taken 
from the file in the Toone case so as to advance matters favoring 
its own position should not be condoned nor allowed to substitute for 
the admission into evidence of the entire record. Further, the argu-
ments set forth in its various Memorandum briefs seeking summary 
judgment, being devoid of any affidavits, admissions, stipulations or 
other admissible evidence, cannot possibly be upheld by argument-
ative statements volunteered by counsel for respondent. The lower 
court compounded the problem by ordering Weber County into the 
1itig:iti m 5,• th.it there c:iuld be a proper determination of the 
h,•1rncL1n 1 i!1• 1·«l\0t'c'11 the• ·:cvL' Ct>unties, but chose to ignore the 
-18-
fact that Weber County complied with the order and did in fact 
file its Answer. In short, the mistakes, omissions and 
of respondent and the lower court clearly establish such disregard 
for the proper rules of procedure in summary judgment situations 
as to clearly violate constitutional safeguards of due process of 
law. The procedural errors and omissions, standing alone, should 
mandate a remand of this matter. 
II. 
A PLAINTIFF WHOSE TITLE IS DERIVED IN PART BY SUCCESSION 
THROUGH ANOTHER LITIGANT PRIOR IN TIME TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF 
RELATED LITIGATION BY HIS GRANTOR, WHOSE ONLY PARTICIPATION OR 
INTEREST IN THE LITIGATION INVOLVING HIS GRANTOR WAS THAT OF A 
WITNESS FURNISHING EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND WHO HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION 
PREDICATED ON A DIFFERENT SET OF MATERIAL FACTS AND A DIFFERENT 
LEGAL PREMISE FROM THAT INVOLVED IN THE LITIGATION INVOLVING HIS 
GRANTOR, IS NOT BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
FROM PROCEEDING WITH A SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
The lower court's Memorandum Decision based its summary 
judgment ruling on the generic concept of judicial cstoppel. 
Although at times the ruling crosses over from one concept tc) 
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another without making its position absolutely clear, it is 
difficult to see how summary judgment could be considered in this 
case unless mandated by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
A preliminary analysis of the Memorandum Decision should make 
it abundantly clear that the lower court's reference to " judicial 
notice" can only serve this litigation insofar as we might be 
concerned with admissible evidence which fits within the confines 
of Rule 56(c); likewise, there is no possibility that the ordinary 
rules of res judicata can apply because there is not a single identica 
property-claimant litigant in either the subject case or the Toone 
case. Proceeding next to the nature of quiet title actions, it would 
seem self-evident that no area-wide determination of title, whether 
based upon a river boundary or other critical matter, could possibly 
bind property claimants whose properties were not included in the 
referenced litigation. Such an action should also be clearly labeled 
a quiet title action, either in the pleadings or by publication of 
notice to landowners who either reside beyond the local jurisdiction 
or who cannot otherwise be found or served. 
Any lawver working in the field of real property titles, or 
an ahslr,1ctc1i- or title insurance exc1miner, would find it really 
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amusing to suggest that the Toone litigation could ever affect 
title to lands whose owners were not parties or privies to that 
litigation. Section 78-40-1 through 13, Utah Code Annotated, 
relating to Quiet Title Actions, details the procedure to be followed 
in such actions, and provides the method of service of summons upon 
unknown defendants by publication. Certainly, a property owner 
such as Monroe, Inc., whose property manager filed an Affidavit 
( R. 236) asserting that the State of Utah was claiming and using 
land which it assertedly owned, would have to be considered a prime 
defendant in any quiet title action which the Utah Department of 
Transportation might bring. 
As will be pointed out subsequently, the boundary line between 
Weber and Davis counties Wa.l'established by the location of the Weber 
River on January 10, 1866. Thus, no final determination of the 
physical location of the line could have been made in the Toone 
litigation without Weber County having been made a party to it. 
See American Mutual Building & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 U. 318, 
117 P.2d 293. Nor could any court proceed on its own in litigation 
between two private litigants and change the boundary line between 
two counties since Article XI, Section 3, of the Constitution of 
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Utah explicitly sets forth the procedure to be followed: 
Sec. 3. (Changing county lines) 
No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a 
majority of the voters living in such territory, as well 
as of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall 
vote therefor, and then only under such conditions as may 
be prescribed by general law. 
By the simple process of elimination, it remains that the 
only judicial bar which could conceivably prevent Baxters from 
presenting their case must be premised on the claim that Toone v. 
Johnson Construction Company contained the necessary elements of 
collateral estoppel. That feature, as it might affect the granting 
of summary judgment in this action, will now be addressed. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires that the Baxters 
bP " in privity" with one of the litigants in the Toone case. 
The basic law in Utah is set forth in the case of Searle Bros. 
v.Searle (Utah 1978), 588 P. 2d 689, where the test of privity 
was defined as --
'' ... a person so identified in interest with another 
that he represents the same legal right. This includes 
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in 
property. Our Court has said that as applied to 
judgments or decrees of court, privity means ' one 
whose interest has been legally presented at the time.' " 
In setting forth the four tests determinative of whether 
-22-
collateral estoppel applies, this Court adopted the California 
rule, as follows: 
"l. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted 
a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
In a subsequent opinion, the California Supreme Court 
recognized the necessity for a fourth test: ' Was the 
issue in the first case competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated? ' These four tests have been adopted 
by the majority of jurisdictions as the correct standard 
to apply ... " 
Thus, we concern ourselves with whether Baxters had either 
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property. These 
appellants contend that neither relationship existed. 
(A) Baxters never had a "mutual" relationship in the case 
of Toone v. Johnson Construction Company. 
The lower court's Memorandum Opinion ( R. 251) recites: 
" Plaintiff Baxter appeared in the trial as a witness; 
obviously knew its character and object and was 
interested in its result. Plaintiff is, therefore, 
estopped from making this challenge to the deter-
mination of invalidity of the tax sale and deeJ." 
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Similar general statements, which the lower court 
apparently accepted, are liberally placed throughout the various 
Memorandum briefs filed in this matter by respondent Department of 
Transportation. 
Baxters, on the other hand, expressly deny that either of 
them had any tie or interest in the Toone litigation such as would 
invoke collateral estoppel. Except for the admission and stip-
ulation set forth in this brief, there is nothing in this record 
on appeal to even show that Ronald L. Baxter was a witness in the 
Toone case, let alone being interested in its results. Respondent 
has failed to produce any relevant portion of the record in the 
Toone case showing any participation by either of the Baxters therein, 
no transcript of the testimony of Ronald L. Baxter in the Toone 
case has been introduced, and respondent has failed to support its 
assertions concerning Ronald L. Baxter's appearance as a witness in 
the Toone case by affidavit or any other credible evidence. Further, 
except for the fact that Ronald L. Baxter furnished expert surveying 
testimony as a witness in the Toone case, both of these appellants 
categoricallv that either of them were otherwise involved in 
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that litigation in any way whatsoever. 
Ronald L. Baxter filed his Affidavit in this matter ( R. 127) 
wherein he stated: 
" 5. I appeared as an expert witness in the case of 
Toone v. LeGrande Johnson Construction Company, et al., 
Civil No. 20915, as referenced in the Motion of the State 
of Utah for Summary Judgment; however, my appearance was 
solely for the purpose of furnishing survey information 
taken from my field notes and old government survey notes 
and to establish physical points and boundaries in the 
general area, and I took no in the litigation as 
a participant in any way whatsoever and was not represent-
ed in the action by legal counsel." 
There is nothing in the Record on Appeal in this case beyond 
the above-quoted statement from Mr. Baxter's Affidavit which this 
Court can consider relative to any "mutual" relationship that either 
appellant had with any litigant in the Toone case. Obviously, neither 
appellant was legally represented in the Toone litigation nor did 
either of them have a legal, economic or other interest in any 
possible proceeds of that litigation. This Court has had occasion to 
expand upon the Searle Bros. case in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 U. 494, 
136 P.2d 957: 
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata 
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment; 
that it only affects the parties .:ind their success.irs 
in interest, and those who are in privity 1vith :1 p.1rt 
thereto... This court has defined the \vc•rd ' privit 
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as a 'mutual or successive relationship to the same 
right or property.' As applied to judgments, the word 
means one whose interest has been legally represented 
at the time." 
( Underlining added) 
Further, this Court has also held that for the " mutual" 
relationship to occur there must be identical interests present. 
See Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 U. 362, 
296 P. 233. That Ronald L. Baxter was a stranger to the Toone 
litigation is pointed out in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 530: 
"530. 1.fuo is a stranger; right to intervene. 
A party to the principal case is regarded as a stranger 
to the judgment rendered in the previous action where he 
was not directly interested in the subject matter 
of, and had no right to make defense, adduce testimony, 
cross-examine witnesses, control the proceedings, or 
appeal from the judgment, even though he could have made 
himself a party to the previous action. " 
These appellants, being non-parties, cannot possibly be bound 
by the decision in the Toone case. 
As stated in 46 Am. Jur 2d, Judgments, Sec. 532, even if 
Baxters might have anticipated a future situation such as that which 
involved Mr. Toone, such interest does not constitute privity: 
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"Pri vi ty is not established, however, from the me re fact 
that persons may happen to be interested in the same 
question or in proving or disproving the same state of 
facts, or because the question litigated was one which 
might affect such other person's liability as a judicial 
precedent in a subsequent action. The term ' privity' when 
applied to ajudgment or a decree refers to one whose interest 
has been legally represented at the trial. ... " 
Similarly, the rule is amplified in Section 536: 
Sec. 536. Necessary interest and control in case; amicus 
" It is recognized that the participant's interest in 
the outcome of the litigation within the contemplation of 
this rule may not be an incidental interest, but must be a 
direct interest-- an interest which will be directly and 
innnediately affected by the judgment in the case; and such 
incidental interest as that the decision may in another, 
disconnected litigation, pending or contemplated, be used 
as a precedent in favor of the participant, is not sufficient 
to call into operation the application of the rule. On the 
same principle, participation at amicus curiae is not sufficient 
to put the rule into operation." 
The mere appearance as an expert witness in another case is 
clearly insufficient to create the " mutual" relationship necessary 
to invoke collateral estoppel against appellant Ronald L. Baxter. 
Nor, for that matter, can the appearance as a witness in a case 
possibly raise collateral estoppel against appellant Shirley Diane 
Baxter, his wife, since she, too, did not actively participate or 
have an interest in the Toone litigation and, further, Cto.h Lrn 
no longer ties a woman's rights and liabilities to those of her 
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husband simply by reason of the marital relationship. See 
Richards v. Hodson, 26 U. 2d 113, 485 P. 2d 1044. 
(B) Baxters never had a " successive" relationship in the 
case of Toone v. Johnson Construction Company. 
The lower court and respondent both placed heavy emphasis 
upon the fact that both Baxters and Toone acquired their holdings 
through the 1969 Tax Deed from Davis County ( R. 250), but both 
followed an erroneous line of reasoning inasmuch as a conunon 
source of title simply does not constitute " successive " interests 
within the concept of collateral estoppel. There is absolutely no 
issue in this litigation as to the fact that Hollberg, Toone and 
Baxters divided the larger tract and took separate deeds to separate 
6-acre tracts some five years prior to the suit brought by Toone 
against Johnson Construction Company. It is just that 5-year time 
span which completely destroys any " successive" relationship be-
tween Toone and Baxters since collateral estoppel cannot reach 
backwards in the chain of title to a conunon source, and then pro-
ceed forward into another property owner. The was 
explained in the previously quoted case of Searle Bros. v.Searle, 
wherein this Court stnted: 
-28-
11 The property interest arose before the commencement 
of the first action, not subsequent thereto, so that 
appellants cannot be regarded as in privity and subject 
to the judgment rendered therein. 
11 
Collateral estoppel as between grantor and grantee will not 
run against the grantee ( here, Baxters) unless the estoppel arose 
prior to and was in existence at the time of the grant. See 
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 117. Obviously, a 
contrary rule would create havoc with land titles and rights in land 
since every landowner would live in fear that his title might be 
impaired or destroyed through litigation involving another securing 
title subsequent in time to a conveyance from the source of title 
common to both. 
46 .\m. Jur., Judgments, Sections 532 and 533 stresses the 
necessity that title or interest must be acquired subsequent to the 
judgment in order to create the " successive" interest establishing 
privity: 
"Sec. 532. Persons included as privies . 
. . . Under this rule, privity denotes mutual or successive 
relationship to the same right of property, so that a 
privy is one who, after the commencement of the action has 
acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by' the 
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judgment through or under one of the parties, as by 
inheritance, succession, purchase, or assignment. There 
is privity within the meaning of the doctrine of res 
judicata where there is an identity of interest and 
privity in estate, so that a judgment is binding as to 
a subsequent grantee, or lienor of property. '' 
"Section 533. Necessity of subsequent acquisition of interest. 
In the absence of the applicability of a statutory provision 
requiring a different result, the general rule is that 
although one to whom an assignment is made or property 
granted by a party to an action during the pendency 
thereof is regarded as in privity with such party within the 
meaning of the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment is 
regarded as conclusive only as between the parties and 
their successors in interest by title acquired sub-
sequently to the commencement of the action, so that a 
person to whom a party to an action has made an assignment 
or granted property or an interest therein before the 
commencement of the action is not regarded as in privity 
with the assignor or grantor so as to be affected by a 
judgment rendered against the assignor or grantor in the 
subsequent action. 
"Ordinarily, a grantee is in privity with his grantor and 
entitled to the benefits of judgments entered in favor of 
the grantor only if the judgments were prior to the con-
veyance of the property .... " 
( Underlining added ) 
Baxters' title, having arisen more than seven years prior to 
the date uf the Toone trial, is in no way a " successive" interest; 
ace 'rdi,-i"l\', privit\• sinipl:; c.mnot possibly exist in the circumstances. 
-30-
(C) The issue in the subject action is not " identical" 
with the issue tried in the case of Toone v. Johnson 
Construction Company. 
Two of the four tests set forth in the case Searle Bros. v. 
Searle, insofar as they apply to the matter at hand, are rather 
closely related. Not only must privity be established for collateral 
estoppel to apply, but it must appear that (1) the issue decided 
in the prior adjudication must be " identical" with that presented 
in the subject action and (4) the issue actually litigated in the 
first case have been competently, fully and fairly litigated. 
Both litigants in the Toone case submitted requested jury 
instructions tying the location of the boundary between Weber and 
Davis counties to the statehood date of January 4, 1396, and the 
court so instructed the jury. Unfortunately, the Allen Smith 
Company, publishers of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, did not furnish 
cross-references or annotations for Article XI, Section 1, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah or Sections 17-1-9 and 32 
( defining the boundary line between Davis and Weber counties) 
beyond a point of time determined from Revised Statutes of Utah of 
1898, and this omission 1,·as the cause of, 'r .1t lc>;:ist a Cllntrihuti:1_ 
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factor to, the use of an improper date to establish the true 
boundary line between the two counties. It was only sometime after 
the conclusion of the Toone trial and the entry of judgment that 
an analysis of the evidence in that case revealed the existence 
of old Javis County plat maps and taxing history which could not 
be reconciled with some of the evidence introduced at that trial. 
A subsequent detailed examination of older Utah statutes provided 
the answer. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah adopted the then existing 
counties: 
"ARTICLE XI. COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS 
Section 1. Existing counties, precincts, and school 
districts recognized.) 
"The several counties of the Territory of Utah, existing 
at the tjme of the adogtion of this Constitution, are 
hereby recognized as legal subdivisions of this State, 
and the precincts, and school districts, now existing 
in said counties, as legal subdivisions thereof, and 
they shall so continue until changed by law in pursuance 
of this article. 
( Underlining added ) 
The boundaries of the counties of Utah which were " ... 
L'Xisting at the· tim<= of the adoption of ( the) Constitution ... " 
\vLT<· ciL.ic1llv dt·Cinc·d in Sccticms 156 and 157 of the Compiled 
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Laws of Utah of 1876. Thus, unless contiguous county lines were 
changed by a majority vote as provided in Section 3 of Article XI, 
the original county lines cannot be changed. Further, the various 
statutory provisions relating to the bounciaries between counties as 
have been adopted over the years-- and usually with different 
sections and titles-- cannot alter the January 10, 1866 boundary 
because to do so would constitute an unconstitutional act. Summit 
County v. Rich County, 63 U. 194, 224 P. 653. As a matter of fact, 
the location of the Weber River in the affected area constituted the 
boundary between the two counties as of January 10, 1866, and no 
constitutional change has been made, nor has any statutory change 
been made or attempted. 
In the case of Schaer v. State of Utah, by and through the 
Utah Department of Transportation, previously cited, this court 
noted that collateral estoppel will not apply-- even if privity is 
present-- where there is a different issue to be litigated: 
11 
The issues in the present case focus on whether the 
first and fourth tests are satisfied. 'h:e ( must, there-
fore) determine whether the issues actually litigated 
in the first action are preciselv the some as those 
raised in the present action. ' \./i.ld(J v. '.'iicl-Ct'nturv 
Insurance Co., l'tah 635 P.'.'.d .'.+17, 41:• 1 1 1•161, 1 c'.Tlpi1asi.s 
added). 11 
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The general rule enunciated in similar situations, even when 
applicable to the same parties in two litigated cases, is that 
res judicata ( and, obviously, collateral estoppel) does not apply 
where the result of the first trial resulted from an erroneous 
proposition of law. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 416 states the rule: 
Sec. 416. Issues of law. 
There are cases stating that the doctrine precluding 
the relitigation of issues previously adjudicated in an 
action on a different cause of action, is confined to 
issues of fact or, at least, to mixed questions of fact 
or law, and thereby excluding questions of law from the 
operation of the doctrine. Under the rule, the doctrine 
does not extend to erroneous propositions of law applied 
by the court in reaching its decision. Where, for example, 
a court in deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, 
the parties in a subsequent action upon a different demand 
are not estopped from insisting that the law is otherwise, 
merely because the parties are the same in both cases. 
11 
••• As to questions of law, ... the rule supported by the 
American Law Institute Restatement is that where a question 
of law essential to the judgment is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final personal judgment, the 
determination is not conclusive between the parties in a sub-
sequent action on a different cause of action, except where 
both causes of action arose out of the same subject matter 
or transaction; and in any event it is not conclusive if 
injustice would result. 11 
It would constitute an unusual and unjust rule of law to hold 
th;it E::ixt,·rs sl«mlc! he hound bv ,Jn erroneous rule of law adopted in the 
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Toone case, particularly under circumstances where they had 
absolutely no ability or authority to control that litigation. 
Again, and for an entirely different reason, collateral estoppel 
cannot and does not apply in the situation before this Court. 
SUMMARY 
The Utah Department of Transportation is attempting to 
quiet title in itself in and to the entire 18.00 acres of land sold 
at tax sale by Davis County without ever going to trial and putting 
on evidence to support its title. In the subject action, which 
involves 6.00 acres, its Third-Party Complaint has attempted 
( Appendix a-c) to quiet title to the entire 18.00 acres. Although 
Mr. Ward appeared as attorney for Johnson Construction Company in 
the case brought by Toone, listing his appearance as "Assistant 
Attorney General", he made no attempt to include the State of Utah 
as a party to that litigation. We can ask why respondent chose to 
remain in the shadows in that case-- and the answer appears rather 
obvious. 
In seeking to quiet title to the larger 18.00 acre-tract of 
which the subject parcel is a portion, respondent nth t''' 
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appearance of Weber County in the case and fails to submit 
admissible evidence before any trial court, in clear contravention 
of the statutory rules of procedure applicable to those who seek to 
quiet title to real property. The Department of Transportation 
apparently takes the position that it need not comply with Section 
78-40-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"Section 78-40-13. Judgment on default-- Court must 
require evidence-- Conclusiveness of judgment.--
When the summons has been served and the time for 
answering has expired, the court shall proceed to 
hear the cause as in other cases, and shall have 
jurisdiction to examine into and.determine the 
legality of the plaintiff's title and of the title and 
claims of all the defendants and of all unknown 
persons, and to that end must not enter any judgment 
by default against unknown defendants, but must 
in all cases require evidence of plaintiff's title 
and possession and hear such evidence as may be 
offergd respecting the claims and title of any of 
the cefendants, and must thereafter enter judgmEnt 
in accordcir.ce with the evidence and the law. The 
shall be conclusivE against all the persons 
named in the summons and complaint who have been 
served and against all such unknown persons as 
stated in the complaint and summons who have been 
served by publication." 
( Underlining added) 
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CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment should be reversed and set aside, and this 
matter should be remanded for trial on the issue of the location of 
the Weber River as of January 10, 1866 and such other legal and 
factual matters as may be necessary to determine real property 
titles and boundaries among plaintiffs Baxters, defendant Department 
of Transportation, Weber County, Davis County and such other real 
property owners whose titles might be affected by any substantial 
change in the course of the Weber River subsequent to January 10, 
1866. 
Respectfully submitted. 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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Appendix p. a 
It appearing to the Court and the Court now finds that 
heretofore, on the 3rd day of March, 1983, this Court made 
and entered its Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant 
and Third-Party Plaintiff, Utah Department of Transportation 
in the above-entitled proceeding, and said Summary Judgment 
is hereby referred to; and 
It appearing to the Court and the Court now finds that 
pursuant to the law and the said Judgment, 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
parcel of property hereinafter described: 
S 1/2 of N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of Section 
25, 5 N., 1 w., S.L.M. containing 18 
acres. 
is hereby quieted in the name of the Utah Department of 
Transportation and is located in Weber County. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a copy 
of this Final Order be filed with the County Recorder of 
Weber and Davis County, State of Utah. 
DATED this day of April, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
CALVIN GOULD, D1str1ct Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a copy of the Final Order 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to Glen E. Fuller, 678 East 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, Rodney S. Page, 
Davis County Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, 
Utah 84025, and Donald C. Hughes, Jr., Weber County Attorney, 
Weber County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah 84401, this ?{ 
day of April, 1983. 
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